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ERASING THE PAST: DESTRUCTION AND PRESERVATION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE
IN FORM ER YUGOSLAVIA
Part I
by Igor Ordev
Igor Ordev received the MA in Southeast European Studies from the National and
Kapodistrian University of Athens, Greece. Previously he has worked on projects like the
World Conference on Dialogue Among Religions and Civilizations held in Ohrid in 2007.
He lives in Skopje, Republic of Macedonia.
INTRODUCTION
The armed conflict in former Yugoslavia is the longest lasting, most destructive and most
complex crisis in Europe the international community had to deal with since W orld War II. The
wars in former Yugoslavia have made a great impact on the whole community, in a negative as well
as in positive sense: negative, of course, as we all know are the consequences of all wars that take
a long time to be buried and forgotten. Human lives that have ended before their time and the
trauma to the ones that survived the tragic incidents is something that is irreplaceable. The positive
results, as much as they are hard to find, are the lessons learned after everything that took place in
these ten years of violence and destruction in the Balkan region.
Hundreds of objects with different purpose have been a part of the “cleaning of the land”
campaigns, which have taken place in these newly formed countries. M ost of the influential
countries and international organizations in the world became involved in the attempt to bring the
conflict under control but in most of the cases the results were partial.
M any religious and other types of objects such as the Oriental Institute in Bosnia and other
important museums throughout the conflict areas were targeted on purpose by the armies or the
people themselves from every side of the conflicts. A major result of the conflicts culture was that
it has suffered the greatest shock in its history.
I am going to focus my attention on this cultural aspect of the war, the destruction of the
cultural heritage of each of the ethnic groups that were brought up together in former Yugoslavia
in the history of the last fifteen or so years. All of it was done in order to gain territory--something
that has been very popular in the nineties in the Balkans,. A lot of unique, priceless churches,
monasteries, mosques, shrines and other religious objects dating from past centuries, as well as
non–religious objects were harmed or destroyed. In the war planning, or at least the theory behind
such destruction, is the idea that a new page of history is to start from here, and the old one was
about to be erased.
This paper assesses a presentation of three case studies that were both complex and
fascinating. It starts with the preservation of cultural heritage in general by explaining its
characteristics. Then the examples of Bosnia, Kosovo and at the end finishing with the case of
M acedonia will conditions shaping these countries and their peoples. By trying to capture all the
aspects of the situation, meaning the history of the relations between the two sides, the governing
bodies at the time of the conflict and some other characteristics I will try to show most aspects of
the issue.
M y working hypothesis is that what happened in the Balkan region in the 1990s and the
beginning of the 21st century has played a crucial role in transforming Yugoslavia into many small,
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quite nationalistic countries with a territory cleansed from any traces of the previous habitants.
Despite all the efforts of the external factors from Europe and the United States of America, an
essential piece of the history is now missing to support the facts and myths about this area. It has
been a great lecture for everyone to learn, and indeed a painful one.
I. PRESERVATION IN GENERAL
As we are focusing primarily on the preservation of the cultural heritage of a certain
groups or ethnicities, we must emphasize some basic characteristics related to the topic. It’s
important to capture all the aspects of the thesis by answering some basic questions.
I. 1. What is heritage?
Heritage is defined by the New Oxford Dictionary as:
That which is or may be inherited: fig. the portion allotted to a specified person,
group, etc. b. Property consisting of land etc. that devolved on the heir at law as
opposed to the executor. 2. The fact of inheriting; hereditary succession. 3. A gift
which constitutes a proper possession… 4. Inherited circumstances or benefits.
‘Heritage’, in our present context, certainly implies a gift for future generations and benefits for the
community. These definitions may, perhaps, reflect a ‘western’ preoccupation with economic
rationalism, and a view that the land and material possessions are to be used for generating wealth,
either now or in the future, through speculation or investment.1 The term “cultural heritage”
meanwhile, implies a certain gift and a path to the next generations which are obliged to follow the
tradition and customs of the previous generations.
There are two kinds of cultural heritage, tangible and intangible. Tangible are the once
that are made from a certain material such as buildings, houses, religious monum ents, different
types of shrines etc. They can be historical, political, statues of leaders, areas of battle and so on.
The intangible are the ones that bring back the memory of a certain historical event or person. They
can be names of cities, toponyms, names of streets, or an historical personality such as Skenderbeg.
I. 2. What is the reason for their destruction?
There are various reasons for destruction of historical or cultural artifacts. Sometimes the
official reason for destruction is only a cover up for some other purpose. It can be a religious,
nationalistic, political reason. Also because of property reasons such as to who should a certain
piece of land belong. A change of sovereignty is another case where by removing everything that
reminds people of the former owner focuses on teaching the younger generations a different aspect
of history.
I. 3. How does this happen?
Terrorizing is one way of erasing the evidence of the past, but there are other ways also,
such as gradual transformation of the monuments into objects that would serve another purpose.
Sometimes there is no need to destroy them or change their use but simply leave them to decay.
W ithout the regular maintenance, it will be a matter of time when these objects will collapse.
I. 4. Why preserve heritage?
If conserving heritage is likely to be both expensive and difficult, why should we do it?
There are many reasons. Cultural heritage can preserve aspects of our culture and history and add
to our sense of belonging and group identity. All forms of heritage can help define and maintain
a sense of identity at local, regional, national, and global scales. In fact, heritage items are part of

1

Graeme Aplin, Heritage: Identification, Conservation and Management, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002),

p. 13.
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the context that makes us human.2 It says a lot about who we think we are and explains our
behavior and roots of out character.
If it’s useful for the society today and in the future to be able to show and prove that a
certain event has really taken place, in that certain way and no other, then every object connected
to that fact can serve as documentation-which results in the society’s will to preserve that object.3
Shared heritage allows us to see ourselves as members of a group or society, not just as an
individual in a sea of individuals. It helps impart a sense of a group in the minds of both group
members and others; in other words, it helps define both internal self–image and external images
held by others.
Heritage thus helps differentiate group from group, and place from place. Just as we each
have a personal definition of heritage, so heritage helps define our personalities, our places of
residence, work and play, and the groups to which we belong.4
I. 5. How do we save it?
Everything is connected to the social aspect and the kind of society that we have. If we have
a democratic society then preservation would be respected through building a social and legal
framework. In a number of countries, the only actor traditionally involved in heritage preservation
is the state itself, but in other countries there is a richer network of individuals and organizations,
many of which are nongovernmental and nonprofit.5 These organizations are playing increasing
roles in the preservation process in recent history. Other institutions that are involved in this
process are the external organizations such as UNESCO, UN, EU and the local NGO’s.
I. 6. What has been done in that field?
The destruction of numerous historic monuments during the Second W orld W ar and the
weakness of legal procedures for the protection of cultural property were the reasons for the
initiative taken to improve protection immediately after 1945. Right after the W WII several
initiatives were taken in order to bring proper legislation for the protection of the cultural heritage
in the world.
There can be no doubt that The Hague Convention of 14 M ay 1954 for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, the Regulations for its Execution, which form an
integral part of it, and the Protocol of The Hague of 14 M ay 1954 for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict constitute the most important instruments for the
protection of cultural property in contemporary international law. They form a true code for
cultural property.
The convention is based on the idea that the preservation of the cultural heritage is not only
a matter for the State on whose territory it is located but 'is of great importance for all peoples of
the world and that it is important that this heritage should receive international protection.6
I. 7. Financial assistance
It is important for the international organizations such as UNESCO and others to help the
governments that are willing to promote coexistence and understanding among people by
preservation and reconstruction of the cultural heritage of the dominant group as well as the
heritage of the minorities in the country. If governments cannot sustain the cultural heritage of their
2

Ibid., p. 4
Stevan Tomic, Legal Protection of Cultural Monuments in Yugoslavia, (Belgrade: Vojno Stamparsko Preduzece,
1958), p. 104.
4
Aplin, op.cit., p. 5.
5
J. Mark Schuster, “Choosing the Right Tool(s) for the Task” in Preseving the Built Heritage edited by J. Mark
Schuster, (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1997), p.131.
6
Ibid., p. 24.
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countries independently, then they must provide mechanisms by which partneships can be
established with community organizations.
This is much harder to achieve in countries where there has been fundamental social and
political change and where the pressures of personal survival in daily life must take priority. These
countries suffer collateral damage throughout their lands and their economy doesn’t allow the
government to spend the needed financial assistance for the survival of the cultural heritage. In
those situations loans in form of grants are the best solution for the problem. The most common
direct incentive comes in the form of grants.
I. 8. Proper education
One thing that every governing body should concentrate is a proper education of young
people about the value of the cultural heritage, not only its financial aspects. Is it possible for
schools in multi-cultural polities to educate youths in way that respects the various cultures, yet
simultaneously instills the common values and requisite skills that are necessary to function in the
society at large? Can an educated program which must recognize youths to roles in a mass society
do so without undermining local cultures and communities or causing youths to become alienated
from them?7 Especially in places such as the countries of former Yugoslavia where there is a mix
of cultures, religions and mentalities, this way of educating people could be crucial for the future
interaction among these groups. It’s important to create a learning environm ent such that the
students identify with local community values and norms and develop concern for the welfare of
their fellow students at the school. Equally important is to create an atm osphere in which the
student feels at home, but is also challenged to contribute to something that is larger than oneself.8
In the following sections I will describe the process of “cultural cleansing” in the cases of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and M acedonia by presenting the important aspects of the thorny
issue.
II. THE CASE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
So much has been said and written in the recent past about the war in B&H that it seems
that every aspect of it was covered and thoroughly examined. However, that is not entirely true.
Not much has been said about the beautiful, priceless architecture that suffered substantial damage
during the beginning of the 1990s. M uch has been talked about the number of victims who lost their
lives, but not much about the number of architectural victims of this war.
The architecture of churches, monasteries, and mosques is most certainly connected to the
history of the Bosnian people it embodies, their cultures and religions. These three words are maybe
the most important ones in this whole story: history, culture and religion. Further perhaps this is
where we should look for the solution of the “problem of Bosnia.”
Bosnia–Herzegovina has existed culturally, historically, and indeed politically, for more
than 1,000 years, while former Yugoslavia was a historically short–lived collection of different,
separate identities, joined in a fundamentally artificial way and thus liable to disintegrate.9 That
means that despite how the Serbian and Croatian states or peoples feel about the Bosnian people,
and their relations towards them, the Bosnian state and its people have been present in the Balkan
region for centuries.
7
Timothy Ready, “Learning to Participate: Humanistic and Pragmatic Education for a Multicultural Community,
Polity and World” in Relations between Cultures edited by George F. McLean and John Kromkowski, The Council for
Research in Values and Philosophy, 1991, p. 279
8
Ibid., p. 288
9
Rasmir Mahmutcehajic, “The Road to War” in The War in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 1991-1995 edited
by Branka Magas and Ivo Zanic, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), p. 149.

RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXVIII, 4 (Novem ber 2008)

page 19

Alone in medieval Europe, the Kingdom of Bosnia was a place where not one but three
Christian churches–Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and a schismatic local Bosnian
Church–existed side by side. W hile the leaders of all three churches were called upon by medieval
Bosnian rulers to witness acts of state, the state did not regularly favor one church over others.10
Historically, we can see how all three churches were functioning side by side without having one
dominate over the others. So the next question is how is it possible for these three churches to
cohabitate together for so long and suddenly to feel threatened by each others presence? W e have
to draw the conclusion that other factors besides differences in religious faith and practice caused
the current difficulties. W hile this war developed due to completely different reasons and has other
causes, nevertheless, it is true that the war has been dressed in religious clothing in order to
disguise its real motives. 11
II. 1. THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE BOSNIAN CONFLICT
Religion did play an important role in the recent tragedies in the Balkan region. As never
before, the answer to the question: to which of the three religions does one belong has been a
question closely connected to one’s future.
The first part of the explanation of the relations among religions takes us back to the issue
of the status of religion in the former Yugoslavia. In the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
there was freedom of expression of religion: however, there were important limitations to such
expression. No public display of religious beliefs or rituals was permitted, and devoutness was not
compatible with holding membership in the Yugoslav Communist Party.12
W ith the break up of Yugoslavia and the fall of communism, a new order has arrived.
Religious practice has increased in recent years with the end of communism. Even more important
politically was the use of religion as part of the ethnomobilization strategy of Slobodan M ilosevic,
Franjo Tudjman, Alija Izetbegovic and other politicians. M any people identify themselves as
M uslim, Orthodox, and Catholic even though they do not profess or practice any religion. Yet,
given the insane logic of ethnic cleansing, their life might depend on whether they are M uslim
atheist, Orthodox atheist, or Catholic atheist. At this point, religious identity has lost its religious
meaning; religion has been reduced to little more than an artifact, another way of describing
cultural, ethnic or national differences.13 But it is perhaps THE essential artifact in the political
calculation.
The public and open display of religious celebrations was a sign of new democratic times,
when both political and religious beliefs could be expressed openly.14 Thus, the church and religion
found its freedom to intervene in every sphere of the community beginning from the top, the
government going down to every person individually. National awakening has taken place; in that
awakening religion and its leaders helped create the separation among people with almost the same
language and ethnic makeup.
Nationalism goes on hand–in–hand with religious revival. Nationalism does not function
as an alternative to religion, entering when and where religion weakens, but they advance both
mutually, reinforcing one another with the same dynamics and the same trends, penetrating
10
Andras Riedlmayer, “From the Ashes: The Past and Future of Bosnia’s Cultural Heritage” in Islam and Bosnia,
Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-Ethnic States edited by Maya Shatzmiller, , (Ithaca: McGill-Queens University
Press 2002), p. 100.
11
Paul Mojzes, ed. Religion and the War in Bosnia, (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1998), p. 133.
12
Riedlmayer, op.cit., p. 28.
13
Mojzes, op.cit., p. 223
14
Riedlmayer, op.cit., p. 29.

RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXVIII, 4 (Novem ber 2008)

page 20

together. Nationalist reawakening and religious revivals seem to be complementary today.15
Even though all three religions (Orthodox, Roman Catholic and M uslim) have redeveloped
rapidly, it has to be said that the Serbian Orthodox Church has probably been far more influential
than any other church or religion in the region. It has been the loudest in giving support to the
Serbian people living outside Serbia in their attempt to achieve their goals. The Serbian Orthodox
Church has justified their actions because of the past, because of the tremendous suffering they
claim for the Serbian Orthodox people over the centuries. “The church has contributed to the war,
therefore, not in creating aggressive and chauvinistic Serb nationalism but in validating its claims
of national rights and myths of victimization, and giving it theological and religious legitimacy.” 16
In practice, the church shaped the Serbian interpretation of its actions, including genocide, or ethnic
cleansing, and in that way gave individual fighters motivation and support for actions which they
otherwise might have resisted.
The church’s nationalist vision is rooted in two related concerns. First, the church defines
the Serbian nation as a natural entity, an organic body that cannot survive and flourish if it is
divided or if it is separated from its religious, specifically Orthodox, roots. There is a strong sense
that one who is not Orthodox is not Serb, and that all Serbian Orthodox peoples should live in the
same state or nation. Second, the church shares with many Serbs a deep sense of insecurity growing
out of a history of victimization: by Turks during the Ottoman Empire, by Tito’s communism in the
post–W ar period, and especially, by the Ustashe during W orld W ar II. This sense of victimization
has been an overriding factor in the church’s response to the Yugoslav crisis.17 This deep-rooted
perception of victimization has given birth to the idea of revenge in the community and at the same
time, has given the proper justification for action. As Paul M ojzes says, the Serbian Orthodox
Church sees itself as a defender of Orthodoxy at the frontier of Islam’s assault on Europe and
Roman Catholicism’s assault on Eastern Orthodoxy.
As for Islam, even though it has been present in Bosnia for centuries, it isn’t as influential
in the sphere of religious practice as is Orthodoxy for the Serbs. In Bosnia, many people from all
social and religious backgrounds–more than half the population by the 1700s–adopted the
triumphant faith of the Islamic conquerors. A distinctive Bosnian–M uslim culture took form, with
its own architecture, literature, social customs, and folklore.18 Because of the power of the Ottoman
Empire and its significance in the world, a basically secular version of Islam became the dominant
culture in Bosnia.
In comparison with Islamic, the spheres of high culture in the Catholic–Croat and especially
in the Orthodox–Serb component were much poorer, which is understandable considering their
position in the Turkish Islamic state. Despite Islamic tolerance in principle of other monotheistic
religions, in practice their members were second–rate citizens. 19 It was during the period in which
religion played a large part in public life when a lot of the architecture in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
especially mosques and other types of shrines were built, so under the Turks in the Ottoman era,
Bosnia has become an Islamic state. “M ythodology” obscures the politically sensitive question of
the ethnic identification of today's M uslims prior to the conversion to Islam, whether originally
Serb or Croat, most of these M uslims clearly have Slavic and Christian origins.20
The question of the ethnic and religious origins of Bosnians was formally addressed in a
15

Mojzes, op.cit., p. 117.
Ibid,, p. 238.
17
Ibid., p. 234.
18
Riedlmayer,, op.cit., p. 102.
19
Ivan Lovrenovic, A Cultural History, (New York: New York University Press, 2001), p. 218.
20
Mojzes, op.cit., p. 100.
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document produced by the First Session of the Country–wide Anti–Fascist Council of the National
Liberation of Bosnia–Herzegovina, enacted during the night of November 25–26 1943, at
M rkonjic–Grad, said: “Bosnia–Herzegovina is not Serbian nor Croatian nor M uslim, but Serbian
and Croatian and M uslim.” 21
Following the Second W orld W ar, cultural and religious buildings resumed: In Bosnia
alone, some 400 new mosques were built between 1945 and 1985, and some 380 mosques were
renovated. By 1986, there were some 3.000 mosques in former Yugoslavia as a whole.22 Even
though Islam has not taken a radical position in the past in Bosnia, in fact, quite the contrary, it had
mixed quite well with other cultures and religions, and by the 1990s, it had become a distinctive
mark for the Bosnian people. The sense of religious belonging became quite strong and as it grew
at the same pace as nationalism. More and more people became devoted to their faith: visiting the
holy places regularly, worshiping the saints as never before, and at the same time, gaining a sense
of disrespect for the ‘others.' As the situation in Bosnia grew more desperate, some M uslims began
to speak in terms of a jihad, which combined with the increasing visibility and power of specifically
Islamic military units within the Bosnian military contributed to a sense that the conflict was a holy
war.23 This meant that there was no possibility of a reasonable solution or even of turning back and
leaving everything as it was. New history had to be written, and it had to be done effectively. As
one way to do that was to erase everything that had been built in the area, ever, that reminded
people of how the past really was. It is religious buildings–mosques, churches, monasteries–that
serve as the most potent markers of a community's presence.24
Thus hundreds of churches and mosques have been intentionally destroyed, appeals to
religion in official propaganda were ubiquitous, and the use of religious symbols in torture were
just some of the ways the conflict has been defined according to a complex relationship between
national and religious identity. 25
II. 2. THE “CULTURAL CLEANSING” IN B&H
As the communist era was coming to an end, new states were arising from nowhere. The
first one was Slovenia, which on the path to independence had almost no negative experience. Then
it was Croatia that moved in the same direction as Slovenia. There was only one thing that differed:
everyone had to go along with the vision of an independent Croatia, and, as always, someone
objected.
The Serbs of Bosnia, in undisguised close cooperation with Serbs elsewhere in Croatia and
Serbia, held their own referendum in late 1991 to justify a refusal to go along with a prospective
move by Bosnia's Croats and Muslims to withdraw from Yugoslavia.26 It was a clear signal sent to
the nationalists back at home, who were waiting for a sign or cry for help, perhaps, in order to go
along and peruse their long term goal: Greater Serbia.
On April 6, 1992, the day the EC's recognition of Bosnia's independence took effect, Serbian
snipers in the top floors of the Holiday Inn in Sarajevo sprayed peace demonstrators with
machine–gun fire. By that time over 1.300 people had been killed in the burgeoning war that
21
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rapidly engulfed the nascent Bosnian state.27 This was the beginning of the horrifying times that the
people of Bosnia had to witness. It was the continuation of the terrifying developments that were
a part of the Croatian fight for independence. The country of Bosnia has suffered in every sense of
the word: physically, psychologically, economically, politically, and every other form that one can
think of. The country was attacked from two sides, by the Serbs and the Croats, with the only
difference being that the Croats became the allies throughout the war and the Serbs with the help
of JNA (the Yugoslav National Army) stuck to their positions to the end.
M ore than one thousand of Bosnia’s mosques, hundreds of Catholic churches, and scores
of Orthodox churches, monasteries, private and public libraries, archives, and museums were
shelled, burned, and dynamited, and in many cases even the ruins were removed by nationalist
extremists in order to complete the cultural and religious “cleansing” of the land they had seized.28
This destruction was mostly done with specific plans and orders previously decided by the heads
of the Armies. Even though an atmosphere was created to think that all these places were
accidentally damaged or destroyed, evidence shows that these places were their military objectives.
“M osques and Catholic churches were destroyed in areas where there was no fighting while under
Bosnian Serb control: they alone were targeted. The surrounding buildings showed no damage.” 29
Targets included: the National Library in Sarajevo, the Regional Archives in Mostar, local
and national m useums, the Academy of M usic, the National Gallery, entire historic districts,
M uslim and Jewish cemeteries, and above all, the places of worship of ethnic and religious groups
that were singled out for what was euphemistically called “ethnic cleansing.” 30 In brief, everything
that represented a sign that such a nation had existed, had to be removed. It is a process of “cultural
cleansing.” The armies and the equipment that the three sides had were significantly
disproportional. The Yugoslav Army had about 90.000 troops in Bosnia: it controlled most armories
and munitions stockpiles and could rely on over forty fighter planes, hundreds of tanks and heavy
artillery, and many thousands more troops stationed in Serbia. Bosnians possessed only a single
tank. The Bosnian army was so poorly prepared partly because Izetbegovic had clung until the last
moment to the hope of a political settlement.31 The Croatians had support from the Croatian
President Franjo Tudjman, and artillery was brought illegally from the neighboring countries and
of course, Croatia. Unlike the Croatian side, the Bosnian’s, who did not have neighbors who were
not participating in the war, could not have been less prepared for the war.
In 1993, emboldened by the W estern powers' endorsement of ethnic partition, Croatian
nationalists launched an all–out war to carve an ethnically pure “homeland” out of Herzegovina
and part of central Bosnia. There had been ominous signs the year before, in the first months of the
war, following the devastating April–June 1992 siege of M ostar by the Serb–led Yugoslav National
Army (JNA), in which most of the city's historic monuments–including seventeen of its nineteen
mosques and all three of M ostar's Catholic churches–had been damaged or destroyed by JNA
shelling. 32
An hour after sunset on the evening of 25 August 1992, the National Library was

27

J Robert .Donia, and John V.A. Fine, Jr., Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed, (London: Churst and Co.
Ltd, 1994), p. 238.
28
Riedlmayer, op.cit., p. 99.
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bombarded and set ablaze by a tightly targeted barrage of incendiary shells fired from Serb
nationalist positions on the heights overlooking the building. The library was located in the center
of Sarajevo’s old town, at the bottom of a deep valley.
An estimated 1.5 million volumes were consumed by the flames in this, the largest single
incident of deliberate book–burning in modern history.33 Before it was burned, the National Library
held 155.000 rare books, unique special collections and archives, 478 manuscripts codices, more
than 600 runs of periodicals, the national collection of record of all the books, newspapers, and
journals published in Bosnia since the mid–nineteenth century, as well as the main research
collections of the University of Sarajevo. W ith the destruction of this very important center for the
people of Bosnia, and for historians as well, no concrete evidence exists any longer about the history
in this half a century and the architecture which was being built in that time. So not only were the
objects such as mosques destroyed, the evidence that they had existed, was also destroyed. There
was no use to destroy something that could be rebuilt according to the plans and sketches found
in books and other materials which showed exactly how the mosques had looked.
Three months earlier, the Serbian gunners' target had been Sarajevo's Oriental Institute,
which housed the country's largest collection of Islamic manuscript texts and the former Ottoman
provincial archives. It was shelled and burned with all of its contents on M ay 1992.34 The losses at
the Oriental Institute included, “the country's richest collection of Islamic manuscripts (5,263
codices in Arabic, Ottoman Turkish, Persian and Bosnian), many of them unique, the products of
five centuries of Bosnian M uslim cultural history.“ 35 It also included a collection of Ottoman–era
provincial archives and a nineteenth–century cadastral registers recording the ownership of land
in Bosnia at the end of Ottoman rule. This was a critical “disappearance:” important in order that
a new restructuring of the land could take place. Everything was brought to a “new beginning”
status. It is noteworthy how, in such a mixed area as Bosnia was a process of “cleaning” everything
and separating cultures that were indivisible occurred as all came down to “One nation, one
culture, one state.” 36
As the war rapidly developed, more and more holy places suffered damage. In the territory
seized by Bosnian Serb forces during the war, out of many hundreds of mosques, only one escaped
destruction.37 A small town called Foca on the Drina, east of Sarajevo, serves as an example of what
occurred. In April 1992, Foca was overrun by Serb nationalist militia, who killed or expelled the
town's majority Bosnian–M uslim population, set up a rape camp for M uslim women in the local
sports arena, and then blew up Foca's sixteen ancient mosques. Among them was the Aladza
M osque, built in 1557, once one of the loveliest examples of Islam ic religious architecture in the
Balkans. “Cleansed” of its mosques and M uslims, Foca has been renamed Srbinje (“Serb Town”)
to celebrate its new ethnically pure identity.38 Today, nothing can connect the long historically
significant town for Islam and Bosnia itself to the present, pure, in every sense of the word, Serbian
community. It is very clear that what happened there took a long time to prepare and organize. It’s
interesting to hear a comment from Simo Drljaca, Bosnian Serb police chief in the Prijedor area:
“W ith their mosques, you must not just break the minarets....You've got to shake up the foundations
because that means they cannot build another. Do that, and they'll want to go. They'll just leave by
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themselves.”39 That was the strategy used by the Bosnian Serbs in order to “get rid” of the M uslims
once and for all. Nor was the tactic something new in this kind of situations. It has been used a lot
of times before, as for example in the Greek–Turkish wars among many others throughout the
world.
In 1993 there was the deliberate destruction of mosques throughout the entire country. In
Trebinje, on the night of 27 January 1993, Serb nationalist militiamen celebrated the feast of St. Sava,
the medieval founder of the Serbian Orthodox Church, by burning down the town's oldest mosque
and expelling thousands of Trebinje's Bosnian–M uslim residents.40 In the Serb–occupied town of
Bijelina in eastern Bosnia, in the beginning of the year six mosques were blown up in a single night.
There are some reported cases where people, Bosnian M uslims were also burned while visiting the
mosques. More than 30 members of the Muslim congregation were reportedly burned alive when
the mosque of Hanifici in Kotor Varos was destroyed.41
Not only Bosnian Serbs were involved in massive destruction of the old and priceless
objects throughout Bosnia. The Bosnian Croats were “cleaning” the other part of the country,
Herzegovina. An example is Fojnica, a town in the mountainous area west of Sarajevo with a mixed
M uslim and Croatian population. In an effort to recapture Fojnica, Croatian forces counteratacked
on November 10, 1993. They burned two mosques in a town to the east; M uslim s retaliated by
burning a Catholic church in a nearby village. W hen M uslim forces of the Bosnian government
appeared to be losing ground to the Croatian assault, rumors spread among Fojnica's M uslims that
the Franciscan monastery harbored a radio transmitter and was being used as a storehouse of
weapons for the Croatian forces. Four M uslim soldiers of the Bosnian Army entered the monastery
grounds on November 13, to witness with their own eyes the soldiers ruthlessly executed the
monastery's two leading clerics. 42
As we can see, no party was “innocent” in the process of destruction, or better to say,
nobody is totally innocent in a time of war. To conclude, all three sides took part in the deliberate
destruction of holy places; the question is simply who was the initiator of the whole process?
A famous researcher in this field Andras Riedlmayer was, and still is, one of the few who
did a study of the number of damaged and destroyed important buildings and religious places in
Bosnia and Kosovo. Riedlmayer studied 392 cultural and religious heritage sites in 19
m unicipalities in Bosnia, in a broad arc from Visegrad and Zvornik in the east to Prijedor in the
northwest and Nevesinje in the south. He found that 92% of the 277 Islamic mosques were either
heavily damaged or destroyed. The same was true for other Islamic religious monuments, such as
turbes (shrines) and tekkes (dervish lodges). “Virtually no minarets survived the 1992–1996 war
intact in the parts of Bosnia controlled by Bosnian Serb forces,” he concluded in his report filed with
the court.43 His testimony was objective and based on thorough research, enough so that it was
taken as evidence in the court of law in Hague. In fact, if it were not for his books dealing with this
subject, not much would be known, recognizing that the Bosnian M uslims haven’t spent much time
writing about it and the Serbs, of course, are not too eager to write about their destruction of the
religious, cultural, and historical past.
A table made by Riedlmayer44 also dealing with the subject is instructive:
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Destruction of Islamic religious buildings in Bosnia 1992 – 1995
Building type

Total No. Before
War

Congregation mosques (Dzamije)

1,149

927

80.68

557

259

46.50

1,706

1,186

69.52

Qur’an schools (Maktebi)

954

87

9.12

Dervish lodges (Tekije)

15

9

60.00

Mausolea, shrines (Turbe)

90

44

48.89

1.425

554

38.88

Small neighborhood mosques (Mesdzidi)
Total no. of mosques

Bldgs of religious endowments (Vakuf)

Total Destroyed or
Damaged

Percentage
Destroyed or
Damaged

South of Sarajevo lies the city of M ostar, which owes its name (“Bridge – keeper”) and
prosperity to the graceful Ottoman bridge that joined the banks of the Neretva River.45 It’s a place
that was well known, and quite often visited by tourists coming from all parts of the world. On
November 9, 1993, sustained artillery barrage by Croatian forces destroyed the elegant white
marble M ostar bridge spaning the Neretva river, an act of senseless and deliberate destruction on
a par with Yugoslav army’s bombardment of Dubrovnik. Dating from 1556, the M ostar bridge was
treasured by members of all three ethnic groups and by millions of foreign tourists who had visited
it over the years. A long with the physical suffering inflicted on M ostar's civilians and the nearly
total devastation of the city, the mindless destruction of the M ostar bridge deepened the despair
of those who still hoped to preserve pluralism and a multiethnic society in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. 46
The political reality in the rest of modern Europe, especially the developing European
Union, is a totally different picture that what is being attempted in the Balkans. M any nationalities,
many cultures, many races are connected and scrambled in a world without borders and
boundaries. The most ironic thing is that these Balkan countries are eager to achieve the same thing,
to become a part of that mixed Europe one day, hopefully in the near future.
II. 3. THE END OF THE CONFLICT
Now the three governments have a lot of work in order to preserve what is left untouched
and undestroyed. People are willing to forget and move on with their lives, but they also want the
same comfort in their lives as before. Even though in different ways, help has been asked from
international organizations in order to try to rebuild the destroyed mosques in the (now) mostly
Serb and Croatian towns and villages. The effect is not yet apparent. The will of the people, who
are now living in those places to turn back to the things as they were, is very low, or even
nonexistent. A M uslim citizen of Banja Luka has said: “It is as though they have torn our hearts out.
They wanted us to understand we had no place here.” 47
The fight for a piece of land is not a recent idea. It has taken place before and will be
repeated in the future many more times. As long as there are leaders with “great” ideas, there will
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be wars and devastation. To put it simply, the war in B&H is the necessary result of a nationalist
political philosophy and functioning nationalist political strategies, dominated thus far in
transnational processes but with contrasting fundamental political objectives. The basic political
idea that is being followed is best expressed by the formula of G. M azzini: “Every nation one state.
Only one state for every nation.” 48
Not everyone was in favor of this option, but a lot of soldiers had to follow the given orders
and go against their personal beliefs. “Never in the history of the Serbian people has there been as
much desertion as during this most recent war” 49 as Hoare says, meaning that not everyone
believed in what they were fighting for. The lucky ones escaped, some were forced to go through
it, and others really believed in the vision that was offered to them.
On February 5, 1994, a single mortar shell landed in a busy downtown Sarajevo
marketplace, killing sixty–eight people and wounding two hundreds others. Although the attack
was one of hundreds that had killed and maimed civilians since the war began, the concentrated
and highly publicized slaughter crossed an imaginary threshold of the world's toleration for
violence. American and French leaders who had feuded publicly about Bosnia only days before,
quickly reached an agreement aim ed at ending the killing of civilians in Sarajevo. The French
agreed that NATO should be prepared to employ air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs. In exchange,
the Americans promised to become more actively involved in the Geneva negotiations. UN
secretary General Boutros Boutros–Ghali authorized the use of air strikes, and NATO issued an
ultimatum to all parties (directed principally at Bosnian Serbs) demanding that all heavy weapons
be brought under UN control or withdrawn from a 20–kilometer zone around Sarajevo by February
21.50 The war was coming to an end.
During 1994 M ilosevic clearly came to recognize that the culminating point had been
reached and that it was in the Serbs interest to see the war end.51 This decision was not received
warmly by the ones who were living for this dream to turn to reality. It was so close, yet so far. The
one side that really had something against the current situation was the church. The Serbian
Orthodox Church strongly opposed M ilosevic’s acquiescence to the international community’s
demands that Serbia end support for the Bosnian Serbs and give up the idea of a Greater Serbia.52
Unfortunately for those who opposed it, the international pressure was too great to be ignored.
Croatia was taking the risk of being put under an embargo in terms of export and import of
products. Serbia was also in a hard position; that’s why President Slobodan M ilosevic decided to
step back from what was happening.
II. 4. THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP
The three leaders around whom everything gravitated were Alija Izetbegovic, Franjo
Tudzman and Slobodan M ilosevic. All of them were hard core nationalists and known for their
visions about the sizes of their counties. It was a fight for land and all sorts of means were used to
justify the attacks. One key component of controversy and inter-ethnic hostilities was the charge
that a M uslim-led state in Bosnia would mean the establishment of a radical Islamic fundametalist
regime. Suspicion centered on the figure elected in 1990 to the Bosnian presidency, Alija
Izetbegovic. He had been put on trial in 1983, by the Communist authorities on political charges,
stemming primarily from his unpublished manifesto circulating since 1970 as “The Islamic
48
49
50
51
52

Mojzes, op.cit., p. 110.
Magas and Zanic, op.cit., p. 213.
Donia and Fine, op.cit., p. 268.
Magas and Zanic, op.cit., p. 218.
Mojzes, op.cit., p. 236.

RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXVIII, 4 (Novem ber 2008)

page 27

Declaration”.53 Critics take the deepest offense at the claims of The Islamic Declaration in the
specific references, regarding “the incompatibility of Islam with non-Islamic systems. There can be
neither peace nor coexistence between the Islamic religion and non–Islamic social and political
institutions.” Islam, the Manifesto, declares, is only strong if it completely rejects accommodation
to western (W estern) socio–political norms and structures.54 So the vision that Izetbegovic had
about the building of an Islamic state in Bosnia once the M uslim population became majority has
been a subject of considerable controversy. This situation also helped the other two sides in their
quest for a good rationale for their deeds . . . even though they will never be justifiable. Radical
Islam has always been a threat to the W estern world; that threat was well used by the other two
parties in order to get sympathy for their action, and they did. The “powerful” states were fully
involved after years of suffering and devastation. This does not mean that they understood that the
Bosnian M uslims had also suffered, but they probably thought that the situation would calm down
sooner rather than later.
II. 5. PRESERVING THE CULTURAL HERITAGE
The presence of the international bodies and organizations in Bosnia were rarely mentioned
in books and other materials, especially in the context of cultural heritage preservation. The lack
of interest of these organizations to commit and enter earlier in the process of putting a stop to the
deliberate destruction of cultural heritage has made a great difference in a country which now has
little historical evidence of its past. W hile paying little attention to the problem and leaving the
initiative to the EC, the United States continued in principle to support Yugoslavism until early
1992.55 There were some initiatives to calm the situation once and for all by getting all three parties
to talk and negotiate with each other, but those ideas were never realized.
The European leaders invited leaders of all three parties–Serbs, M uslims and Croat–to
Lisbon in late February 1992, prior to the scheduled referendum on independence, in a last– minute
effort to negotiate an agreement to “cantonize” or partition the republic.56 They were unsuccessful
mostly because of the Serbian side which was looking for independence of the Serb part of Bosnia,
Republika Srpska and any other alternative was not a solution in their eyes. There were other
proposals such as the Vance–Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg plans, but they were all turned down
by the Bosnian Serbs.
In June 1992, the UN augmented forces in the former Yugoslavia with UNPROFOR troops
assigned specifically to Bosnia.57 This was a sign that the U S was ready to participate in the
negotiations for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even though the European Union and the UN
had other views and visions about the situation, they merged during the London Conference in
August 1992. Despite the eagerness of the US and the EC to recognize the pluralistic, multiethnic
Bosnian state, W estern words were not backed by the means necessary to secure the Bosnian
republic against the threats of those who aspired to dismember it.58 As this was the case, it couldn’t
be expected that the cultural sights of the country would be saved, not by the state, not by anyone.
The only thing that can be done is now, in the aftermath of the war. One of the most
important ways in which governmental and international agencies can support the work of cultural
reconstruction is through sponsoring programs for training and technical and material assistance
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that can help bolster the capability of the local institutions in Bosnia. It’s a good thing that people
are getting more and more aware of the significance of these historical sites and are looking for a
way to preserve the ones that are still existing. Various kinds of NGO’s and other kind of
institutions and organizations are involved, foreign as well as domestic. At the local level, where
most authority now resides, there is a serious shortage of expertise and resources for dealing with
the cultural catastrophe wrought by the war.59
W ith the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement in 1995, the war was officially
over and many organizations were able to help the locals in their efforts to stabilize the situation
on every level of the society. One of the features of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement is a clause
(Annex 8) establishing a Commission to Preserve National M onuments, which, along with the
Commission on Human Rights (consisting of the Office of the Ombudsman and the Human Rights
Chamber), is among the few governmental bodies granted jurisdiction in both the Federation and
the Republika Srpska, the two entities that together comprise postwar Bosnia–Herzegovina.
However, more than five years after Dayton, the Commission to Preserve National M onuments
remains mired in disputes about procedural issues and has yet to undertake any meaningful
measures for the protection of Bosnia’s cultural heritage.60 Even though there is a strong will by the
international players to be of some help in this complicated situation, the problem still remains in
the deep rooted hatred among the three sides.
There are cases where people are willing to come back to their homes and continue their
old life, but the ones who are now residents are opposed to such a possibility. M ore than a year
after the end of the war, in January 1997, United Nations police monitors escorted two busloads of
Bosnian–M uslim refugees seeking to return to their homes in Stolac. They were turned back on the
outskirts of town by a stone–throwing mob organized by the Croat nationalist mayor of Stolac. As
the refugees and their UN escorts retreated under a hail of eggs and stones, the mob chanted: “No
more M uslims, no more mosques, no more bowing prayers.”61 The sites where the mosques once
stood have been reserved for public parks and other uses according to the bureau of urban
planning, which has declared reconstruction of the mosques to be out of the question.
In frustration, the Islam ic Community of Bosnia, acting on behalf of the few thousand
M uslims who still remain in Banja Luka and the tens of thousands of exiled Banja Lukan Muslims
who want to return, turned to the Human Rights Chamber for redress. In July 1999, the Human
Rights Chamber ruled that the Government of the Republika Srpska had denied the right of the
Islamic community to freedom of religion by refusing to allow the reconstruction of mosques
destroyed in the war. The chamber specifically established that the Islamic community had
property rights to fifteen sites of destroyed mosques and the right to enclose the properties.
According to the decision, the Government of the Republika Srpska may not allow other
construction on these sites and must issue any construction permits necessary to rebuild mosques
on seven of the sites.62 As it seems, this unpleasant situation will last for a long time and it won't
be settled until everyone puts their negative feelings for each other away. Even then, no one will
want to mention anything about this period, so it seems there will be no major changes in near
future.
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